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Abstract
In line with the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States and the Working Family Tax
Credit in the United Kingdom, the Flemish government implemented in 2007 a similar in-work tax
credit in order to increase the employment rate and to make working nancially more attractive.
This paper investigates how total labour supply changes and checks if the cost reductions due
to these behavioural reactions are large enough to defend such expensive policies. It appears
that married women alter their labour supply decision the most. However, due to the small tax
credit, total labour supply e¤ects are of minor size and hardly o¤set the large costs. Only a more
generous tax credit leads to a higher activation of unemployed, however the budgetary cost is
huge.
Keywords:Public economics, Taxation, Labour supply, Discrete choice
JEL classi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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, present an updated discrete labour supply model for Belgium and
secondly, use this model to analyse potential labour supply e¤ects of the implementation of a tax credit
in the Belgian tax benet system. In 2007, the Flemish government introduced an in-work tax credit, the
Jobkorting, to create incentives for the inactive population to enter the labour market. In literature, two other
studies can be found that model the Belgian labour supply and analyse the changes in labour supply caused
by several policy reforms. Orsini (2006) investigates the e¤ects of the implementation of the Workbonus
and Decoster et al. (2010) analyse the potential labour supply e¤ects of three di¤erent proposals of labour
market policy reforms in Belgium. The work presented in this paper can be seen as another contribution to
this literature.
In order to evaluate the potential e¤ects of labour market reforms, a proper labour supply model needs
to be developed. Two alternative ways can be followed. The rst method that is frequently used is ex-post,
meaning that the e¤ects of the tax reform can only be estimated once the reform has taken place. In some
cases, it is possible to set up an experiment to asses the e¤ects of a specic reform. Examples are the New
Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment in the US (Killingsworth, 1976) and the Self Su¢ ciency Program
in Canada (Card and Robins, 1996). Target groups were randomly extracted from the population and were
treated with the new tax-benet system. The e¤ect of the reform is estimated as the di¤erence between the
treatedgroup and the non-treatedgroup. However, for policymakers it is often convenient to have an idea
of the potential e¤ects of a reform before it is actually implemented. Therefore, ex-ante evaluation models
have grown in popularity and the model developed in this paper also relies on this framework.
Up to the nineties, the traditional way of ex-ante labour supply modelling was in a continuous way, see
Hausman and Ruud (1986) and Arrufat and Zabalza (1986), where the household chooses from a continuous
set of hours. The household selects the best combination of labour supply and consumption so as to maximize
its utility function, given a time and budgetconstraint. However, this way of modelling labour supply
has some problems. First, assuming a continuous set of hours implies that one has to derive the full
budgetconstraint of each household, i.e. the net disposable income at each hours point. In such models,
very small intervals of labour supply hours are needed for each household, say for example 1 or 5 minute
intervals. Combining this with a large sample of around 1000 observations and a standard amount of time
of 80 hours a week leads to very time-consuming work. Second, the maximisation problem is very complex
because the tax function is often nonlinear which leads to non-convex budgetsets.
Major approvements in estimating labour supply have been obtained by considering labour supply choice
as a discrete one. In this methodology, the households hours choices can be approximated by a discretised
set instead of a continuous one. These types of models are inspired by the random utility models initiated by
Daniel McFadden (MCFadden, 1974).1 Due to the inuential work of Van Soest (Soest, 1995), these discrete
choice models are used in the context of labour supply choice. These models are structural in a sense that
1McFadden applied these discrete choice models to several transport and occupational choices.
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there is no reduced form labour supply function which depends on wages but that the structural parameters
for the preference for consumption and leisure are identied out of an a priori functional form of the utility
function. Note that this method is only possible due to the assumption of a discretised set of hours because
it must be possible to evaluate the utility at each hours point, which is not possible or computationally
cumbersome in a continuous setting. This method of discrete choice will be used in this paper and will be
explained in more detail below.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses three di¤erent forms of the Jobkorting, the
tax credit for all workers in the Flemish region, and analyses how these a¤ect the budgetconstraint of the
households. Section 3 discusses the data and the microsimulation model that is used and presents the discrete
labour supply model and the results of estimation. Section 4 employs this model to analyse the labour supply
e¤ects of the implementation of the Jobkorting and investigates whether this policy reform is actually self
nancing, as many policymakers claim. The last section concludes.
4
2 In-work tax credit: the Jobkorting
For many countries, the tax wedge is very high which often leads to an unemployment trap where inactive
people dont have strong nancial incentives to enter the labour market.2 The nancial di¤erence between
working and being unemployed is so small that they lack the incentive to participate in the labour market and
much unemployment persistence occurs. In order to reduce these traps, several countries created Making
Work Pay(MWP) policies which attempt to create nancial incentives for the inactive to take up work.
Examples are the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program in the United States and the Working Family
Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK. Both programs provide a tax credit when entering the labour market, which
induces the inactives to participate in the labour market. In 2007, the Flemish government implemented
such a MWP-policy, the Jobkorting. As will be explained in detail below, the Jobkorting gives a tax credit
to those people who earn more than 5500 euro/year. This means that this instrument is similar to the EITC
and the WFTC as it tries to stimulate inactive people to enter the labour market in order to be eligible
for the tax credit. However, this instrument is not targeted to individuals who earn little and might create
negative labour supply e¤ects at the intensive margin of the labour market, as will be discussed below.
This section starts by explaining how the Jobkorting is assigned in the years it has been implemented and
discusses the main di¤erences between them. The second part investigates the inuence of this credit on the
budgetconstraint of households and discusses the potentially induced labour supply e¤ects of implementing
the Jobkorting.
2.1 The Jobkorting
Table (1) gives an overview of the Jobkorting from 2007 until 2010. In income year 2007 (for tax year 2008)
every worker who lives in the Flemish region and earns less than 5.500 euro/year is not entitled to the tax
deduction.3 Every worker who earns between 5.500 and 21.000 euro/year receives a yearly tax credit of 125
euro. After reaching a yearly income of 21.000 euro, the credit begins to phase out and each additional euro
earned reduces the credit by 10 cents. This formula implies that the credit completely disappears once the
worker earns 22.250 euro/year. The formula that species the amount of Jobkorting in 2008 is similar to that
of 2007. For 2009, the credit did not phase out after reaching a certain yearly income. Every worker who
lives in the Flemish region and earns between 5.500-22.000 euro/year receives a yearly credit of 300 euro and
this reduces to 250 euro if the yearly earned income is higher than 22.000 euro. There is a second di¤erence
between the Jobkorting of 2007/2008 and 2009. In 2007 and 2008, every month the worker received a share
2The tax wedge measures which percentage of gross earnings (when moving from a period of unemployment to a new job),
is "absorbed" as a result of the combined e¤ect of increased tax and social contribution rates and benets withdrawal. For
example, the taxwedge in Belgium in 2005 is estimated around 85% (Eurostat).
3 Income year refers to the calendar year in which the income is earned. Tax year refers to the year in which the individuals
report and pay their taxes. In Belgium, these two years di¤er by 1 year.
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of the total yearly amount of the tax deduction. For example, if one is entitled to receive a yearly tax credit
of 200 euro, the worker gets a monthly tax deduction of 16,6 euro. In 2009 the payment was not monthly
but the yearly amount was given entirely in the second month of the year.4
The main goal of the introduction of the Jobkorting by the Flemish government is twofold. First, the tax
credit will lead to a reduction of the tax burden for all Flemish workers. Secondly, it aims at an increase
of the employment rate in Flanders because only workers who earn at least 5.500 euro/year are entitled to
the Jobkorting. In other words, the tax credit is launched to induce labour supply e¤ects at the extensive
margin of the labour market as inactive people start to work in order to receive the Jobkorting. However,
as can be seen in Table (1), the amount of tax credit is rather small compared to, for example, the WFTC
where the yearly tax credit is equal to 4934 £ /year (Strickland, 1998). Consequently, one can already expect
in advance that the labour supply e¤ects are minor in the case for Belgium.
4Note, however, that the e¤ect of this di¤erence will not be analyzed in this paper. The focus lies entirely on the e¤ects of
the nancial incentives on the labour supply of households.
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Table 1: Jobkorting
Tax credit Income year 2007- Tax year 2008
Income: Tax credit:
Less than C=5500 C=0
C=5500 - C=21000 C=125
C=21000 - C=22250 C=125 -((income - C=21000) * 0.10)
C=22250 or more C=0
Payment Monthly (Total yearly tax credit/12)
Tax credit Income year 2008- Tax year 2009
Income: Tax credit:
Less than C=5500 C=0
C=5500 - C=21000 C=200
C=21000 - C=23000 C=200 -((income - C=21000) * 0.10)
C=23000 or more C=0
Payment Monthly (Total yearly tax credit/12)
Tax credit Income year 2009- Tax year 2010
Income: Tax credit:
Less than C=5500 C=0
C=5500 - C=22000 C=300
C=22000 or more C=250
Payment Once in February the total amount of yearly tax credit
Tax credit Income year 2010- Tax year 2011
Income: Tax credit:
Less than C=5500 C=0
C=5500 - C=17250 C=125
C=17250- C=18500 C=125 -((income - C=17250) * 0.10)
C=18500 or more C=0
Payment Monthly (Total yearly tax credit/12)
Source: Belastingportaal Vlaanderen
2.2 E¤ect on the budgetconstraint and labour supply
Tax credits lead to a change in total disposable income of households, as discussed in the previous section.
This part illustrates empirically, by using the microsimulation model MEFISTO, how the budgetconstraint of
households alter when the government implements a policy with tax credits.5 A budgetconstraint is the locus
of all combinations of net income at the di¤erent hours points available for a specic household. Obviously,
this income is household dependent as disposable income is determined by the presence of children, being
married or earning a high wage, etc. Therefore, this section discusses the budgetconstraints of a single female
5Modelling and Evaluating Flanders FIscal and Social TOmorrow. This microsimulation model is constructed for the
FLEMOSI-project. For more information, see http://www.emosi.be.
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without children who works full time and has an hourly wage of 20,2 euro.6
Four di¤erent budgetconstraints are shown in gure (1) where three di¤erent examples of tax credits are
implemented. The rst tax credit is the one that was actually implemented in 2009 and is called Jobkorting
2009. However, because this tax credit is rather small and labour supply e¤ects are expected to be limited,
we also choose to simulate a more generous tax credit that is equal to 1747 euro/year, which represents 10%
of the average yearly income of the working people in the sample.7 The third type of tax credit is the same as
the second, i.e. 1747 euro/year, but is more selective as only people with a yearly income below 22.000 euro
are eligible for this credit. For the remaining part of the paper, this former credit is called High Jobkorting
and the latter Selective High Jobkorting.
Looking at the budgetconstraint in the scenario where no tax credit is implemented, net disposable income
does not increase linearly with working hours but has several kinks, especially when working few hours a
week. The horizontal part of the budgetconstraint points at a marginal tax rate of 100%, which means that
disposable income does not increase when working more hours a week.8 This is due to the fact that social
assistance decreases when one earns more income from working.
Implementing the Jobkorting 2009 hardly a¤ects the budgetcontraint of this household as its size is
negligible. The two alternative tax credits, High Jobkorting and Selective High Jobkorting, have a much
larger e¤ect on the budgetcontraint of this single female and one can already expect in advance that they
will alter labour supply in a more considerable way.
Looking at this gure, several potential labour supply e¤ects can arise after the implementation of some
sort of tax credit. First, when working only a few hours a week (8-13 hours interval), one sees that the
slope of all the budgetconstraints increase compared to the situation in which there is no tax credit. This
higher wage results in a substitution e¤ect where leisure is more expensive and more labour is supplied.
However, next to this e¤ect, a negative income e¤ect might arise which leads to a decrease in labour supply.
Combining both e¤ects leads to an ambigious e¤ect on total labour supply. Second, when working more than
15 hours a week, one sees that all the budgetconstraints are shifted outwards in a parallel way which induces
only a negative income e¤ect which reduces labour supply. Third, the budgetconstraint of the Selective High
Jobkorting returns to the original budgetconstraint when working more than 25 hours a week. She actually
receives less income when working 30 hours than when she works 25 hours a week. So, including this selective
tax credit might result in negative labour supply e¤ects when working a lot of hours a week. Combining all
these potential e¤ects lead to an ambigious result on total labour supply for each type of tax credit. It is
expected that some individuals reduce and others increase their labour supply after the introduction of such
6Mesto is able to derive the budgetconstraints of all types of households, but only this type is shown for informational
purposes.
7As discussed in the next section, the Belgian EU-SILC dataset is used.
8Note that this cannot be seen as an unemployment trap, as this term mainly points at a situation where income of working
(for example, part-time or full-time) is not signicantly higher, or even lower, than the income of inactivity. In gure (1), this
is not the case.
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tax credits. Therefore, this paper analyses, using a specic structural labour supply model, the potential
labour supply e¤ects of these three di¤erent tax credits.
Figure 1: Budgetconstraint for 3 di¤erent types of tax credit.
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3 Modelling labour supply
In order to analyse how the implemetation of di¤erent types of Jobkorting a¤ect the Belgian labour supply,
a proper model needs to be developed. This section rst discusses which data are used and secondly derives
in detail the discrete labour supply model.
3.1 Data
This paper uses the Belgian database of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC), which is constructed in a two step sampling procedure and is representative for the Belgian
population in private households. The data was collected in the second half of 2006 and contain information
on income received in 2005. The sample consists of 5860 households or 14329 individuals. Only private
households are included, so all persons living in collective households and institutions are excluded from the
target population. The survey provides detailed information on earnings as well as on sociodemographic
characteristics of each household.
The labour supply model presented in this paper is estimated on two di¤erent sub-samples of couples and
single females.9 Being available for the labour market is the basic condition to belong to one of these specic
subgroups. This means that the individual is aged between 16 and 65 years and is not sick, in education,
disabled or (pre)retired. Analogous with the bulk of the literature, the self-employed are not modelled due to
the lack of reliable information of hours worked and because their labour supply decisions are probably very
di¤erent than those of salary workers. Households whose children are already available for the labour market
but are still living with their parents are also excluded from the sample. It is reasonable to assume that their
labour supply decisions are di¤erent than the ones of a normal household without working-children because
it is not clear whether these households see their labour supply decision as a collective or as an individual
process.10 The mixedhouseholds where only one of the partners is available for the labour market are
also excluded. Examples are households where the female is self-employed and the male is an employee or
households where the male is already retired and the female still works as an employee.
Figure (2), (3) and (4) display the actual distribution of hours worked for single women and men and
women in a couple from the selected subsamples. A clear pattern of concentration of hours can be observed
around inactivity, marginal part-time, part-time, full time and overtime. Therefore, the discrete structural
labour supply model, which is discussed in the next section, assumes that each household chooses among
9Labour supply of single men is not modelled in this paper. In line with many studies in literature, no convergence could
be found in the estimation of male labour supply. This can be explained by the fact that almost all single men work full time
and consequently little variation is observed.
10The labour supply model assumes that the labour supply decision is collective, as discussed in the next section.
Note that this is not the only reason for the exclusion of these households. Including a household with 3 working members
would lead to a computationally cumbersome exercise when the researcher assumes that there are 5 di¤erent discrete labour
supply points. This would mean that there are 125 di¤erent possible labour supply combinations for each household.
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5 di¤erent discrete hours points; i.e. non-participation, marginal part-time, part-time work, full-time and
over-time.11
The microsimulation model MEFISTO is applied to obtain the budgetconstraint of each household.12 It
models the tax benet system of Flanders and is able to generate net disposable income from gross income
by applying the appropriate tax benet rules.
Figure 2: Observerd labour supply: single female
Figure 3: Observed labour supply: female in a couple
11 Inactivity is equal to 0 hours, marginal part-time to 15 hours, part-time to 25 hours, full-time to 40 hours and over-time to
50 hours.
12Modelling and Evaluating Flanders FIscal and Social TOmorrow.
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Figure 4: Observed labour supply: male in a couple
3.2 The structural model of labour supply
3.2.1 Specication of the model
The labour supply of each household is modelled as a Random Utility Model (RUM), as in Van Soest (1995).
The amount of hours worked by the male and female of household i is, respectively, equal to himj and hifk.
where the male works j hours and the female k. In such models, the utility Vijk faced by household i, when
working (himj;hifk) hours, contains a structural and a random component. This structural component of
utility can be measured or approximated by the researcher, whereas the random component of utility is
unknown, at least for the researcher. This utility can be written as follows:
Vijk=U(himj; hifk; Cijk j Xi)| {z }
Structural part
+ ijk|{z}
Random part
(1)
The rst element reects the structural or deterministic component of utility from household i and is
a function of hours worked (himj;hifk) or amount of leisure, consumption (Cijk) when working (himj;hifk)
hours and household characteristics Xi. As discussed before, it is assumed that each household is restricted
to choose between a limited discrete set of hours. Total consumption C is equal to total disposable income
because the model is static and does not allow for savings in the future. The actual utility level Vijk
di¤ers from the measured utility U(himj ; hifk; Cijk j Xi) with a random term ijk, which depends on the
number of hours worked (himj;hifk) by both male and female in household i. It arises from factors such
as measurement errors concerning the variables in Xi, unobserved preference characteristics or optimization
errors of the household. Without this random component, the model would be deterministic. This means
that once the functional form of utility and the households characteristics are known, one would be able to
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determine the exact utility-maximizing choice of hours level. Taking this random component into account
leads to a probability distribution over the available hours levels.
Assuming that this random term is identically and independently distributed according to an extreme
value distribution, McFadden (1974) proves that the probability that household i chooses a combination of
hours (himj;hifk) out of the discrete set (himz;hify) with z = 0; :::; Z and y = 0; :::; Y is given by:13
Pijk = Pr (U ijk U izy;8z = 0; :::; Z , 8y = 0; :::; Y ) = (2)
expU(himj; hifk; Cijk j Xi)PZ
z=0
PY
y=0 expU(himz; hify; Cizyj X i)
:
In line with the work of Keane and Mo¢ t (1998) and Blundell et al. (1999), a quadratic functional form
with interaction between both spouses is assumed:14
U(himj ; hifk; CijXi) = c(Xi): [Cijk   F (Xi)]+c: [Cijk   F (Xi)]2+ (3)
f (Xi): [80  hifk] +f : [80  hifk]2+m(Xi):(80  himj)+m: [80  himj ]2+
fc [80  hifk] : [Cijk   F (Xi)]+mc: [80  himj ] : [Cijk   F (Xi)]+fm [80  hifk] :
The preference parameters depend on personal and household characteristics. Factors such as education,
number and age of children, the individuals own age and the region of residence will a¤ect the preference
for work. This observed heterogeneity will be introduced linearly in the model:15
c(X) = c0+
0
cX
c
i
f (X) = f0+
0
fX
f
i (4)
m(X) = m0+
0
mX
m
i
The model also accounts for possible xed costs of work, F (Xi), which are subtracted from total disposable
household income Ci. These costs can be both psychological and physical and are expressed in both cases in
13This notation allows to di¤erentiate the discrete choice points between male and female. This paper, however, assumes the
same discrete labour supply points for both genders.
14 It is assumed that the total amount of available hours a day is equal to 16 hours. Therefore, total leisure time a week equals
(80-hour worked).
15More advanced models also control for unobserved heterogeneity in the preference structure by adding a random term in
each preference parameter which is typically normally distributed, see Van Soest (1995).
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monetary values. Similar to the preference parameters, these costs vary linearly with the amount of young
children and educational dummies of the mother and try to capture possible xed costs of working, such as
child care related expenses. These costs can be written as follows:16
F (Xi) = f0+f1(Xi) if hifk> 0 j himj> 0
F (Xi) = 2[f0+f1(Xi)] if hifk> 0 & himj> 0 (5)
F (Xi) = 0 if hifk = 0 & himj = 0
As can be seen in (2) and (3), total net disposable income Cijk of each household at each discrete hours
point is needed in order to derive the probabilities. The survey, however, does not contain the net income at
each discrete hours point; it only observes total gross income at the actual observed level of labour supply. It
is frequently assumed in literature that the hourly wage rate is independent of the amount of hours worked,
which implies that gross earnings increase linearly with working time. Consequently, the gross income at
each discrete hours point can be calculated by multiplying every hours point with the hourly wage of each
individual. In most datasets, the hourly wage is not given and has to be derived in order to calculate the
gross income for each discrete hours point. Due to the assumption of constant hourly wages, one obtains the
hourly wage of each individual by dividing the observed gross current income by the actual observed number
of hours worked. Once this hourly wage is calculated, one can derive the gross earnings at each discrete
hours point and the budget constraints for the households are calculated in MEFISTO.
However, there are also households where the gross earnings are not observed but are included in the
subsample, for example unemployed or inactive households. Their hourly wage is imputed with an estimated
wage equation, corrected for possible selection bias using a Heckman correction model. Table (2) and table
(3) present the estimated coe¢ cients for the hourly wage for respectively male and female in a couple. Most
coe¢ cients have the expected sign. Looking at the wage equation for men, one sees that the relation between
experience and hourly wage is concave and between age and hourly wage convex. This means that higher
experience leads to a higher hourly wage but the increase in wages declines the higher the level of experience.
The relation between age and wage is convex for men and concave for women. From the age of 5 onwards,
the higher the age of men, the higher the hourly wage and this increase grows with the age of the men. Note
that these coe¢ cients are not signicant for the female. Higher education leads to a higher hourly wage for
both men and women. Table (4) and table (5) give the results for the selection equation which controls for
possible selection bias. The estimated coe¢ cients have the expected sign but some di¤erences can be seen
when comparing men and women. Having young children has a signicant negative e¤ect on the probability
of being observed in the labour market for women but not for men.
The imputed wages are only assigned to these individuals for which there is no hourly wage observed,
the other individuals receive their observed hourly wage. In 14% of all cases, imputed wages are used.
16The next section also briey discusses a model in which no xed costs are included.
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Table 2: Hourly wages male
Variables Coef. St. Error P-value
Hourly wage:
Experience .425 .090 0.000
Experience squared -.0120 .001 0.000
Age -.573 .191 0.000
Age squared .011 .002 0.000
Schooling : no degree -2.160 1.060 0.040
Schooling :high school 1.300 .440 0.000
Schooling: higher education 6.290 .487 0.000
Flanders -1.220 .490 0.010
Wallonia -1.390 .510 0.000
Constant 15.801 3.400 0.000
Table 3: Hourly wages female
Variables Coef. St. Error P-value
Hourly wage:
Experience .2460 .100 0.015
Experience squared -.0030 .002 0.075
Age .079 .140 0.572
Age squared .-.001 .002 0.897
Schooling: no degree -.951 1.020 0.353
Schooling: high school 1.172 .402 0.004
Schooling: higher education 5.940 .538 0.000
Flanders -1.646 .372 0.000
Wallonia 1.468 .395 0.000
Constant 6.871 2.522 0.006
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Table 4: Selection equation male
Variables Coef. St. Error P-value
Select:
Experience 0.099 0.015 0.000
Experience squared 0.000 0.000 0.810
Age 0.148 0.034 0.000
Age squared -0.003 0.000 0.000
Schooling: no degree -0.429 0.170 0.010
Schooling: high school 0.456 0.098 0.000
Schooling: higher education 1.030 0.106 0.000
Flanders 0.300 0.110 0.000
Wallonia -0.086 0.113 0.430
Number of children between 0-3 year -0.071 0.113 0.520
Number of children between 3-6 year -0.022 0.132 0.860
Number of children between 6-9 year 0.110 0.148 0.456
Number of children between 9-12 year 0.082 0.139 0.550
Number of children between 12-16 year 0.022 0.122 0.850
Constant -1.753 0.643 0.000
rho -.048 .067
sigma 6.950 .103
lambda -.333 .471
LR test (rho = 0) : chi2(1)=0.400 Prob > chi2 :0.527
.
Table 5: Selection equation female
Variables Coef. St. Error P-value
Select:
Experience .159 .011 0.000
Experience squared -.001 .001 0.000
Age .0743 .026 0.005
Age squared -.002 .001 0.000
Schooling: no degree -.0776 .166 0.640
Schooling: high school .246 .079 0.002
Schooling: higher education .931 .084 0.000
Flanders .148 .089 0.096
Wallonia .130 .093 0.162
Number of children between 0- 3 year -.315 .086 0.000
Number of children between 3-6year -.198 .091 0.030
Number of children between 6-9 year -.345 .094 0.000
Number of children between 9-12 year -.112 .094 0.235
Number of children between 12-15 year -.151 .087 0.082
Constant -.813 .484 0.093
rho -.007 .233
sigma 5.255 ..081
lambda -.035 1.222
LR test (rho = 0) : chi2(1)=0.000 Prob > chi2 : 0.980
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3.2.2 Estimation of the model
The structural model of labour supply is estimated using the method of maximum likelihood. The basic idea
of maximum likelihood is that it estimates the parameters of the labour supply model in such a way that
the joint probability of observing the actual hours points for the selected sample is maximized. Equation
(2) gives the probability associated with the chosen hours level of household i. The joint probability, or the
likelihood, of all households, say H households, is given by the product of these individual probabilities:
L =
H

i=1
expU(himj; hifk; Cijkj X i)PZ
z=0
PY
y=0 expU(himz; hify; Cizyj X i)
(6)
Equation (6) is a function of the unknown parameter values, given the available data and reects the
likelihood function. Taking logarithms gives the log-likelihood function of the structural labour supply
model:
logL =
HX
i=1
"
U(himj; hifk; Cijkj X i)  log (
ZX
z=0
YX
y=0
expU(himz; hify; Cizyj X i))
#
(7)
The method of maximum likelihood maximizes equation (7), given the available data. This means that
the parameter values are estimated in such a way that it produces the highest probability of observing the
actual hours values.
Once model (2) is estimated, one can calculate the expected labour supply of each household, respectively
for male and female:
E(him) =
ZX
z=0
YX
y=0
pizy:himz (8)
E(hif ) =
YX
y=0
ZX
z=0
pizy:hify (9)
3.2.3 Results of estimation
Table (6) gives the parameter estimates of the structural labour supply model for couples and single females
and reveals some intuitive results from which only the most important ones are discussed. Looking at the
coe¢ cients that determine the heterogeneity for total disposable income in a couple, a signicant negative
e¤ect is found for the linear term of the age of the women. Apparently, the older the female in a couple, the
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less additional household utility is obtained from extra income. On the other hand, however, the quadratic
term for female age is signicantly positive which implies that the age e¤ect in income decreases up to the
point where the female reaches the age of 52 after which the e¤ect of income once again increases. This age
e¤ect is not signicantly observed for men and for the subsample of single females.
Looking at the estimates for the amount of leisure, a signicant negative e¤ect and a signicant positive
e¤ect is found for respectively the linear and the quadric term of the age of a single female. This results
in the familiar convex function which means that the preference for leisure decreases up to the age of 36,
after which the preference for leisure increases again. Thus, young single female and older ones have a
lower preference for labour supply. This parabolic e¤ect is not observed for women in a couple and only
the signicant negative linear age e¤ect for leisure is observed for men in a couple. Having young children
also has a positive signicant e¤ect on the estimated coe¢ cient for leisure for single female and female in
a couple. This means that the preference for work is lower for these households or that they prefer more
leisure time than a similar female without young children.
Fixed costs of work also seem to be signicantly important in the estimation of the structural labour
supply model. Remember that the xed costs parameters are not estimates of the actual xed costs of work
because they can also include non-pecuniary costs of work, such as search costs and commuting costs. They
can also pick up other institutional factors that inuence the amount of labour supply, without actually
representing preferences of the worker. Therefore, it is always important to keep these considerations into
mind when looking at these coe¢ cient estimates.17 The higher the eduction level of a single female, the lower
the xed costs of work. The constant term is, for both couples and single female, signicantly positive.
17This remark holds for all the estimated coe¢ cients. In line with literature, this model does not incorperate the demand
side of the model so one must be cautious when interpreting the results as purely preferences of the worker.
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Table 6: Estimation results
Couples Single female
Variables Coef. St. Error Coef St. Error
Consumption:
Age female -0.026238*** 0.007638 0.0153008 0.0188429
Age female squared 0.000253*** 0.0000875 -0.0002321 0.0002305
Age male -1.46E-03 0.0064309 - -
Age male squared 0.0000817 0.0000781 -
Children 0-3 0.0130222 .0.0177991 0.2338055 0.1947892
Children 3-6 -4.38E-02*** 0.0218395 0.1196096 0.1525883
Children 6-9 0.0186443 0.0197161 -0.1295517 0.0842049
Large city 0.0266864 0.046281 -0.0909822 0.1394683
Median city 0.0066937 0.0460028 -0.0796307 0.1427769
Wallonia -0.026338 0.0203695 0.0025297 0.0561413
Brussels 0.0679079*** 0.0339876 0.1801158*** 0.089167
Constant 1.947265*** 0.3231685 0.9679574** 0.5140718
Fixed costs of work:
Children 0-3 4.43E-01 3.69E-01 -1.309066 0.9211357
Children3-6 0.8556197 0.5038872 0.5779535 1.019603
Middle education - - -1.424723*** 0.7284128
High education - - -2.812376*** 1.097881
Constant 11.40454*** 2.002373 8.003098*** 2.255549
Consumption squared: 0.0151876*** 0.0047029 0.0769407*** 0.0297078
Leisure male:
Age male .-0.0054151*** 0.0024713 - -
Age male squared 0.000078 0.0000291 - -
Children 0-3 -0.0008024 0.0059051 -
Children 3-6 0.0034109 0.0070707 -
Children 6-9 -0.00503 0.0075245 - -
Large city 0.0320153 0.0175567 - -
Median city 0.0306621 0.017403 - -
Wallonia 0.0264304*** 0.0068835 - -
Brussels 0.0061452 0.0100042 - -
Constant 0.9639143 0.0702209 - -
Leisure male squared: -0.0095821*** 0.0002867 - -
Leisure female:
Age female -0.0013478 0.0022246 -0.0120318*** 0.003076
Age female squared 0.0000472 0.000028 0.0001653*** 0.0000376
Children 0-3 -0.0009471 0.0072153 0.0130952 0.0178473
Children 3-6 0.0137752 0.0091711 -0.0065991 0.0233065
Children 6-9 0.0134794*** 0.0054935 0.0333296*** 0.0150268
Large city 0.0009503 0.0138907 0.0227169 0.0219967
Median city 0.0047423 0.0135497 0.0174243 0.0224721
Wallonia 0.017518*** 0.0060005 0.0108828 0.0090068
Brussels 0.0062204 .0.0103911 -0.0277914*** 0.0114312
Constant 0.4879718*** 0.0743171 0.7390682 0.0868975
Leisure female squared: -0.0067805*** 0.0003452 -0.0058076*** 0.0005688
Cross term consumption and leisure male: 0.0044629** 0.0019576 - -
Cross term consumption and leisure female: -0.0075193*** 0.0014996 0.0032088*** 0.004365
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Given these parameter estimates, one is able to calculate the expected labour supply of each household
(see equation (8) and (9)) and compare them to the actual observed labour supply. Table (7) presents the
observed labour supply of single females and both male and female in a couple, combined with the aggregate
probabilities for each category, once with and without xed costs of work. As discussed in Dickens and
Lundberg (1993), Tummers and Woittiez (1991) and Van Soest (1995), a structural labour supply model
without xed costs does not capture the data very well. They argue that the model overpredicts the amount
of part-time jobs and underpredicts unemployment as such models do not incorporate possible costs of
working. Including xed costs lead to a major improvement of the t for the inactive people, as can be seen
in table (7). Notwithstanding the inclusion of these xed costs, the model does not predict the observed
labour supply completely correct. A possible explanation is that this model assumes that each discrete
hours level is equally available in the labour market for each individual. This is not observed in reality,
thus neglecting these opportunities might lead to results which are not completely in line with the observed
situation. These hours restrictions can be included in a more extended labour supply model (see Dagsvik et
al (1989) and Aaberge et al (1999)) but is not included in this paper.18
Instead of looking at the t with the observed labour supply, one can calculate the wage elasticities in order
to make a judgement of the performance of the model. The structural basis of this discrete labour supply
model implies that there is no explicit labour supply function where one can derive the wage elasticity from.
Therefore, numerical methods are used to analyse the sensitivity of labour supply with respect to wage
changes. The individuals gross wage is increased by 10%, keeping all the other characteristics constant.
MEFISTO simulates the new budgetconstraint of each household and the new expected labour supply can
be calculated, given the estimated coe¢ cients. Dividing the percentage change in expected labour supply
by the percentage change in wage leads to the wage elasticity. Table (8) presents the wage elasticities for
both male and female in a couple and for single female. The hours elasticity reects by how much total
labour supply changes after a certain change in the wage rate. For example, total labour supply for women
in a couple is expected to increase by 2.2% if hourly wages increase by 10%. The labour supply elasticities
are in line with the expectations and the literature, see for example Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). Female
elasticities are, on average, higher than the elasticity of men and are bigger for female in a couple than for
single female. The same quantitative conclusion was found for Belgium in Orsini and Decoster (2007), where
hours elasticity for females and males in a couple is, respectively, equal to 0,30 and 0,08, which only slightly
di¤ers from the results estimated in table (8).19 The participation elasticity is dened as the expected
percentage change in labour market participation due to a 10% increase in gross wages. It measures the
responsiveness of non-participants to an increase in their (potential) gross wage. The same conclusion can
also be made here; married women are the most sensitive compared to single female and married men.
18Alternatively, as pointed out in Van Soest (1995), including alternative specic constants leads to a perfect t with the
observed data. The method of calibration, as suggested in Creedy and Kalb (2005), also leads to a complete t, which is
discussed and applied in the next section.
19They estimated it on the household budget survey of 2001.
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Table 7: Observed and predicted weekly hours distribution
Observed: Male in couple Female in couple Single Female
Inactivity(0-5) 9,56 27,92 34,08
mar part-time (5-20) 1,86 13,07 10,57
part-time (20-30) 2,68 14,99 10,29
full-time (30-45) 71,87 41,13 41,03
overtime (>45) 14,03 2,89 4,03
Predicted without xed costs: Male in couple Female in couple Single Female
Inactivity (0-5) 1,6 18,4 27
mar part-time (5-20) 8,2 21,2 19,7
part-time (20-30) 18,2 22,1 18,3
full-time (30-45) 34,6 20,5 17,5
overtime (>45) 37,4 17,8 17,5
Predicted with xed costs: Male in couple Female in couple Single Female
Inactivity (0-5) 8,39 27,56 34,2
mar part-time (5-20) 0,31 5,52 4,99
part-time (20-30) 10,51 28,13 22,54
full-time (30-45) 61,91 31,36 29,18
overtime (>45) 18,87 7,41 9,04
Table 8: Estimated labour supply elasticities
Hours elast. Participation elast.
Female in couple 0,2213 0,1286
Males in couple 0,0629 0,0481
Single female 0,1606 0,1091
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4 Implementing the Jobkorting
This section evaluates the potential labour supply e¤ects of the Jobkorting by using the structural labour
supply model which is described above. Instead of presenting the probabilities of each hours category, such
as in table (7), this section follows the method of calibration and presents the e¤ects of the reforms by using
transition matrices, as recommeded by Creedy and Kalb (2005). The method of calibration draws error terms
from the extreme value type 1 distribution and adds them to the structural part of utitity (see equation (1)).
If this results in the observed labour supply being the optimal choice for the individual, the draw is accepted;
otherwise, another set of error terms is drawn and checked. This is repeated until 100 sets of error terms
which lead to the observed labour supply are drawn. This produces a baseline which corresponds perfectly
to observed labour supply behaviour.These error terms are used to compute a distribution of labour supply
after the implementation of the tax credits. The credits lead to a change in disposable household income
and consequently in the structural part of utitily, U(himj ; hifk; Cijk j Xi). Combining the new structural
utility with the error terms from calibration, makes it possible to calculate probabilities of being in each of
the discrete hours points after the reform, conditional on the pre-reform labour supply. Consequently, one
is able to generate transition matrices.
The last subsection discusses whether these tax credits are actually self nancing, as many policymakers
claim them to be. They argue that these credits lead to a decrease in unemployment and to an increase
in the number of hours worked by the currently active population. This results in a positive e¤ect on
government revenue through higher personal income taxation, higher social security contributions and lower
unemployment benets and hence partly cover the original cost of the implementation of the tax credits.
4.1 Labour supply e¤ects
The labour supply responses of the implementation of the Jobkorting of 2009 are presented in table (9) and
(10). The former displays all the transitions between the di¤erent discrete hours points (for example, the
percentage of people going from inactivity to part-time work) and the latter calculates the change in labour
supply in Full time Equivalents.
The rst impression conrms the prediction made earlier that labour supply responses are very small.
Looking more into detail, one sees that the tax credit generates e¤ects at both intensive and extensive level
of the labour market. Around 0.61% of all inactive single women and 0.79% of all inactive women in a
couple start to work after the implementation of the Jobkorting.20 Expressing these changes in Full Time
Equivalents, 1495 FTE are generated from the inactive population who are potentially available for the
labour market. As can be seen in table (9) and (10), the majority of the inactives change to full time work.
There are also positive labour supply e¤ects of people who are already participating in the labour market,
20This is respectively the sum of 0.03, 0.24, 0.31, 0.03 in the table for single female and 0.23, 0.41 and 0.15 in the table for
female in a couple.
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i.e. at the intensive margin. For example, 0.29% of all women in a couple who work marginal part-time
before the tax reform change their labour supply status to full-time work. Summing over all categories and
for the three subsamples, total labour supply increases by 1970 FTE. Note that it is not surprising that
labour supply of women who live in a couple change the most compared to single women and men. This
was already seen in the estimated elasticities, where both total labour supply elasticity and participation
elasticity is the largest for women who live in a couple. However, the introduction of this tax credit also
produces some negative labour supply e¤ects at the intensive margin of the market. The model predicts, for
example, that 0.02% of all single women who work part-time before the implementation of the tax credit
reduce their labour supply to marginal part-time. For men in a couple, 0.32% of all men who work overtime
reduce their labour supply to full-time work. Combining all these negative e¤ects over the three subsamples
and the categories results in a decrease of 297 FTE. Eventually, the introduction of the Jobkorting, like it
was actually implemented in 2009, leads to a very small net increase in labour supply of 1673 FTE.21
This limited e¤ect on total labour supply is not surprising as the amount of tax credit is very low and
hardly inuences the incentives of households, as was discussed when presenting the budgetconstraints (see
section 2.2). Therefore, this paper analyses the labour supply e¤ects of a ctitious tax credit which is
substantially higher than that of 2009. Table (11) and (12) present the labour supply e¤ects when the
tax credit is increased up to 1747 euro/year, which is approximately 10% of the average yearly disposable
income. Compared to the Jobkorting of 2009, a larger increase from inactivity into the labour market is
observerd for the three subsamples. For example, 3.03% of all women who live in a couple change their
labour supply status from inactivity to full-time work, compared to only 0.41% when the Jobkorting of 2009
is implemented. The same e¤ect is also observed for single female and men who live in a couple. Next
to these larger positive extensive e¤ects, higher positive intensive labour supply e¤ects are also observed.
For example, 3.30% of all women who live in a couple increase their labour supply from marginal part-time
to full-time, compared to 0.29% in the case of the lower tax credit. This type of tax credit also produces
negative intensive labour supply e¤ects, which are in line with the ones observed in the case of the tax credit
of 2009. Eventually, this higher tax credit induces 14315 more Full Time Equivalents, which is almost ten
times as large as the net e¤ect of the Jobkorting of 2009.22
The third simulation is the implementation of the same higher tax credit, but instead of making every
worker eligible, it is now limited to all workers who earn a yearly income between 5500 and 22000 euro.
Table (13) and (14) present the labour supply e¤ects of this selective tax credit. As expected, the negative
intensive e¤ects are substantially higher as more people lower their labour supply in order to be eligible for
the tax credit. For example, 1.84% of all men who live in a couple and are working overtime before the
implementation of the credit reduce their labour supply to full-time. The total net e¤ect is lower than the
21One must be cautious with these results. Including standard errors is benecial here to derive more robust condence
intervals.
22Note, however, that the budgetary cost is substantially higher in this case. These costs, and the amount compensatory
e¤ects are discussed in the next subsection.
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non-selective version of the tax credit and is equal to 5094 FTE, which is still higher than the labour supply
e¤ects of the Jobkorting of 2009.
4.2 Compensatory costs e¤ects
It is frequently assumed by policymakers that in-work tax credits create large compensatory cost e¤ects due
to the increase in labour supply and decrease in unemployment. Therefore, they defend these costly policies
by asserting that these types of credits are, to a great extent, self-nancing. This section derives this amount
of self-nancing and discusses which type of the three presented in-work tax credits is the most benecial
for the government.
Let X be the gross income of the individuals in the selected sample, Y the net income, R the total
amount of revenues for the government, Sg and Sn respectively the social contributions of the employer and
the employee, T the total amount of taxes paid to the government. The total amount of revenues for the
government R can be written as follows:
R = T + Sg + Sn: (10)
The net income of an individual can be written in terms of gross income, taxes and benets:
Y = X   T   Sn (11)
Rewriting equation (10) and (11) in terms of changes due to the inclusion of a specic policy reform, for
example an in-work tax credit:
R = T +Sg +Sn (12)
Y = X  T  Sn (13)
Combining (12) and (13) eventually leads to an expression for the change in government revenue due to
the inclusion of the policy reform:
R = X  Y +Sg (14)
This paper denes the total amount of compensatory costs of the tax credits as the di¤erence between
the change in revenue for the government in the situation in which labour supply does not change and in
the case in which labour supply changes. This di¤erence can be seen as the total amount of recovery of
budgetary costs due to behavioural labour supply responses induced by the in-work tax credit. Therefore, if
labour supply does not change, this means that only net income of individuals change due to the tax credit.
24
Gross income and the amount of social security contributions of the employer remain unchanged. The total
change in revenue without behavioural responses can be written as follows:
R =  Y (15)
In the other scenario in which behavioural responses arise, both gross income and social security contri-
butions of the employer change, which leads to the following change in government revenue:
R = X  Y +Sg (16)
The di¤erence between (15) and (16) can be seen as the total amount of recovery of budgetary costs for the
government and can be expressed in terms of newly created FTE.Table (15) presents both the budgetary cost
without and with behavioural responses of the three di¤erent types of tax credits and their decomposition.
As expected from the small positive labour supply e¤ect of the Jobkorting 2009, the compensatory e¤ect
represents only 2.81% of the budgetary cost without behavioural responses. This means that the government
pays 204561 euro per additional created Full Time Equivalent. This unitcost is substantially reduced to
136911 euro/FTE when the higher tax credit is implemented, due to the larger increase in labour supply.
However, in order to arrive at this increase, total budgetary cost is almost six times as large as the orginal
tax credit. The total budgetary cost of the higher selective tax credit without behavioural responses is even
higher than the one with labour supply responses. This is mainly due to the fact that labour supply decreases
when working a lot of hours in order to be eligible for the tax credit.
Table 9: Transition matrix Jobkorting 2009y
Pre-reform: Post-reform
Single female: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity(0-5) 99.40 0.03 0.24 0.31 0.03 100
Marginal part-time (5-20) 0 99.87 0.07 0.06 0 100
Part-time (20-30) 0 0.02 99.98 0 0 100
Full-time (30-45) 0 0.01 0.01 99.98 0 100
Overtime (>45) 0 0 0.27 0 99.73 100
Female in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity(0-5) 99.21 0.00 0.23 0.41 0.15 100
Marginal part-time (5-20) 0.05 99.42 0.19 0.29 0.05 100
Part-time (20-30) 0.00 0.00 99.74 0.20 0.06 100
Full-time (30-45) 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.97 0.03 100
Overtime (>45) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100
Male in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity(0-5) 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100
Marginal part-time (5-20) 0.22 99.19 0.00 0.25 0.34 100
Part-time (20-30) 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100
Full-time (30-45) 0.00 0.00 0.06 99.87 0.06 100
Overtime (>45) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.32 99.64 100
y Percentages are computed as the proportion of each specic hours group.
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Table 10: Changes in FTE by category Jobkorting 2009y
Pre-reform: Post-reform
Single female: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity 0 9 123 253 31 417
Marginal part-time 0 0 4 9 0 13
Part-time 0 2 0 0 0 2
Full-time 0 4 2 0 1 7
Overtime 0 0 15 0 0 15
Total 0 15 144 262 33 453
Female in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity 0 0 211 601 266 1078
Marginal part-time 13 0 33 129 32 206
Part-time 3 0 0 82 42 128
Full-time 0 0 0 0 23 23
Overtime 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 16 0 244 812 362 1434
Male in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marginal part-time 8 0 0 15 29 53
Part-time 0 0 0 0 0 0
Full-time 23 0 116 0 76 215
Overtime 0 0 26 84 0 110
Total 31 0 142 99 105 378
y The FTE is derived by dividing total yearly hours worked by 2000.
Table 11: Transition matrix Jobkorting High y
Pre-reform: Post-reform
Single female: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity(0-5) 96.14 0.21 1.22 1.93 0.51 100
Marginal part-time (5-20) 0.00 97.52 0.85 1.12 0.52 100
Part-time (20-30) 0.00 0.00 99.66 0.26 0.08 100
Full-time (30-45) 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.98 0.02 100
Overtime (>45) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100
Female in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity(0-5) 94.81 0.05 1.28 3.03 0.83 100
Marginal part-time (5-20) 0.26 94.33 1.49 3.30 0.62 100
Part-time (20-30) 0.02 0.00 98.03 1.42 0.53 100
Full-time (30-45) 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.81 0.19 100
Overtime (>45) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100
Male in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity(0-5) 95.92 0.03 0.76 2.80 0.48 100
Marginal part-time (5-20) 0.15 96.62 0.54 1.74 0.96 100
Part-time (20-30) 0.00 0.00 99.07 0.70 0.23 100
Full-time (30-45) 0.04 0.01 0.26 99.27 0.42 100
Overtime (>45) 0.06 0.00 0.13 1.64 98.17 100
y Percentages are computed as the proportion of each specic hours group.
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Table 12: Changes in FTE by category Jobkorting Highy
Pre-reform: Post-reform
Single female: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity 0 64 629 1596 525 2814
Marginal part-time 0 0 46 153 100 299
Part-time 0 0 0 27 14 41
Full-time 0 0 0 0 5 5
Overtime 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 64 676 1776 644 3159
Female in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity 0 27 1168 4434 1522 7152
Marginal part-time 69 0 264 1462 387 2182
Part-time 14 0 0 595 374 982
Full-time 0 0 0 0 132 132
Overtime 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 83 27 1432 6491 2415 10449
Male in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity 0 4 173 1018 218 1414
Marginal part-time 5 0 13 106 82 207
Part-time 0 0 0 26 14 40
Full-time 200 18 475 0 505 1197
Overtime 77 0 87 425 0 589
Total 282 22 748 1576 819 3447
y The FTE is derived by dividing total yearly hours worked by 2000.
Table 13: Transition matrix selective Jobkorting Highy
Pre-reform: Post-reform
Single female: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity(0-5) 97.51 0.21 1.23 0.94 0.11 100
Marginal part-time (5-20) 0.00 98.09 0.81 0.85 0.25 100
Part-time (20-30) 0.00 0.05 99.74 0.18 0.03 100
Full-time (30-45) 0.00 0.12 1.26 98.61 0.00 100
Overtime (>45) 0.00 0.09 2.39 0.09 97.44 100
Female in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity(0-5) 95.75 0.08 1.57 2.19 0.41 100
Marginal part-time (5-20) 0.21 96.62 1.35 1.63 0.19 100
Part-time (20-30) 0.07 0.03 98.94 0.84 0.12 100
Full-time (30-45) 0.07 0.13 1.04 98.66 0.10 100
Overtime (>45) 0.15 0.12 1.10 0.74 97.88 100
Male in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity(0-5) 97.63 0.00 0.63 1.38 0.35 100
Marginal part-time (5-20) 0.67 98.42 0.07 0.77 0.08 100
Part-time (20-30) 0.00 0.00 99.51 0.30 0.19 100
Full-time (30-45) 0.05 0.01 0.64 98.96 0.34 100
Overtime (>45) 0.04 0.01 0.57 1.84 97.54 100
y Percentages are computed as the proportion of each specic hours group.
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Table 14: Changes in FTE by category selective Jobkorting Highy
Pre-reform: Post-reform
Single female: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity 0 64 637 780 116 1596
Marginal part-time 0 0 45 116 47 208
Part-time 0 3 0 18 6 27
Full-time 0 80 495 0 0 575
Overtime 0 7 131 2 0 139
Total 0 153 1307 916 169 2546
Female in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity 0 44 1435 3206 753 5438
Marginal part-time 57 0 240 722 116 1134
Part-time 46 7 0 354 87 493
Full-time 208 225 1121 0 68 1622
Overtime 52 28 186 50 0 316
Total 363 304 2982 4331 1024 9004
Male in a couple: Inactivity Marginal part-time Part-time Full-time Overtime Total
Inactivity 0 0 144 502 159 805
Marginal part-time 25 0 2 47 7 80
Part-time 0 0 0 11 12 23
Full-time 238 27 1156 0 409 1831
Overtime 57 5 369 478 0 909
Total 319 32 1670 1038 587 3648
y The FTE is derived by dividing total yearly hours worked by 2000.
Table 15: Compensatory e¤ects of di¤erent types of tax credit
Jobkorting 2009 Jobkorting High Selective Jobkorting High
Cost no behaviour (billion euro): 352.32 2194.70 1061.60
Change in net income (Y) (billion euro) 352.32 2194.70 1061.60
Change in gross income (X) (billion euro) 0 0 0
Change in SSC employee (Sg) (billion euro) 0 0 0
Cost with behaviour (billion euro): 342.42 1959.92 1073.57
Change in net income (Y) (billion euro) 350.26 2382.20 1123.40
Change in gross income (X) (billion euro) 13.32 336.95 40.39
Change in SSC employee (Sg) (billion euro) 4.52 85.33 9.44
Compensatory e¤ect (pct) : 2.81 10.70 -1.13
Cost per new FTE (euro): 204561 136911 210769
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5 Conclusion
In line with the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States and the Working Family Tax Credit in
the United Kingdom, the Flemish government implemented in 2007 a similar in-work tax credit in order to
increase the employment rate and to make working nancially more attractive. This paper investigates how
total labour supply changes and checks if the compensatory costs are large enough to defend such expensive
policies.
In line with more recent literature about labour supply, this paper assumes that households choose
among a discrete set of hours instead of a continuous one. Based on the observed labour supply in the
Belgian EU-SILC data, 5 discrete hours points are chosen; inactivity, marginal part-time, part-time, full-
time and over-time work. To account for possible costs of working, the model accounts for xed costs of
work, such as search costs, child care related expenditures or commuting costs.
It appears that the tax credit that was actually implemented in 2009, the Jobkorting, leads to only
minor changes in labour supply. In line with the estimated wage elasticities, married women alter their
labour supply the most. This small result is not surprising as the amount of in-work tax credit is negligible
compared to, for example, the EITC. Therefore, this paper also investigates how two other tax credits,
which are considerably larger in size, a¤ect the labour supply decision. If the tax credit is increased to 1747
euro/year instead of 250 euro, total change in labour supply equals 14315 Full Time Equivalents (FTE),
instead of 1673 FTE. Consequently, the compensatory e¤ect is much larger and equals 10.7% instead of
2.8% but the budgetary cost is huge.
29
Bibliography
Aaberge, R., U. Colombino, and S. Ström (1999). Labour supply in italy: An empirical analysis of joint
household decisions, with taxes and quantity constraints. Journal of Applied Econometrics 14 (4), 403422.
Arrufat, J. L. and A. Zabalza (1986). Female labor supply with taxation, random preferences, and optimiza-
tion errors. Econometrica 54, 4763.
Bargain, O. and K. Orsini (2006). In-work policies in europe: Killing two birds with one stone? Labour
Economics 13, 667697.
Blundell, R. and T. Macurdy (1999). Labor supply: A review of alternative approaches. 3, 15591695.
Card, D. and P. K. Robins (1996). Do nancial incentives encourage welfare recipients to work? evidence
from a randomized evaluation of the self-su¢ ciency project. Princeton University Working paper No. 738 .
Creedy, J. and G. Kalb (2005). Discrete hours labour supply modelling: Specication, estimation and
simulation. Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 928 (928).
Dagsvik, J. and S. Strom (1989). A labour supply model for married couples with nonconvex budget sets
and latent rationing. Central bureau of statistics, Discussion paper .
Decoster, A., K. De Swerdt, and G. Van Camp (2010). Modelling labour supply and policy reform in the
belgian tax benet model mimosis. Report for FPS Social Security, Part 2.
Dickens, W. T. and S. J. Lundberg (1993). Hours restrictions and labor supply. International Economic
Review 34 (1), 169192.
Hausman, J. A. and P. Ruud (1986). Family labor supply with taxes. American Economic Review 74,
242248.
Keane, M. and R. Mo¢ tt (1998). A structural model of multiple welfare program participation and labour
supply. International Economic Review .
Killingsworth, C. C. (1976). Must a negative income tax reduce labor supply? : a study of the familys
allocation of time. Journal of Economic Literature 14 (3), 946948.
MCFadden, D. (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. Frontiers in Economet-
rics Chapter 4.
Soest, A. v. (1995). Structural models of family labor supply: A discrete choice approach. The Journal of
Human Resources 30 (1), 6388.
Strickland, P. (1998). Working family tax credit and family credit. House of Commons 46/april.
30
Tummers, M. P. and I. Woittiez (1991). A simultaneous wage and labor supply model with hours restrictions.
The Journal of Human Resources 26 (3), 393423.
31
List of Tables
1 Jobkorting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Hourly wages male . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 Hourly wages female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 Selection equation male . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5 Selection equation female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6 Estimation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7 Observed and predicted weekly hours distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8 Estimated labour supply elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9 Transition matrix Jobkorting 2009y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10 Changes in FTE by category Jobkorting 2009y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11 Transition matrix Jobkorting High y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12 Changes in FTE by category Jobkorting Highy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13 Transition matrix selective Jobkorting Highy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
14 Changes in FTE by category selective Jobkorting Highy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
15 Compensatory e¤ects of di¤erent types of tax credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
List of Figures
1 Budgetconstraint for 3 di¤erent types of tax credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Observerd labour supply: single female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Observed labour supply: female in a couple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 Observed labour supply: male in a couple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
32
 Copyright © 2011 @ the author(s). Discussion papers are in draft form. This discussion paper 
is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without 
permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. 
 
 
